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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(i)

Nature of the Case:

This case arises out of a dispute of whether a deed for conveyance ofland also transferred
a portion of an appurtenant ground water right.

Respondents Jay and Cln-istine Brown (the

"Browns") brought a declaratory and quiet title action against Appellant Augusta Greenheart
("Greenheart") arguing that a portion of an adjudicated ground water right was not sold nor
transferred with the sale of 60 acres ofland that Greenheart had purchased from the Brovms.
(ii)

Facts:

On or about February 5, 1988 the Jay Brown acquired approximately 320 acres of land
situated in the East Yz of Section 24, T4S, R5E, B.M_, in Elmore County ("Original Brown
Property") by way of a Quitclaim Deed. [R. Vol. III, p. 538].

The Snake River Basin

Adjudication ("SRBA") Court in Twin Falls, Idaho, decreed \Vater Rights Nos. 61-2188 and 617151 (See. Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 in Exhibits to Clerk's Record; also found in [R. Vol. L

pp. 25-28]) to Brown on October 26, 2000, authorizing the use of groundwater to the 320 acres
comprising the Original Brown Property. Id. Water Right No. 61-2188 was decreed authorizing
the irrigation of up to 164 acres ofland within a permissible place of use that encompassed the
320 acres comprising the Original Brown Property. [R. Vol. III, p. 538]. Water Right No. 617151 was decreed authorizing the irrigation of up to 123 acres ofland within a permissible place
of use that encompassed the 320 acres comprising the Original Brown Property. [R. Vol. III, p.
539].
In December of 2006, the Browns listed for sale 60 acres of their Original Brown
Property with an asking price of $80,000, the property was listed with real estate agent Daryl
Rhead. [R. Vol. III, p. 539]. In 2006, Greenheart spoke with agent Daryl Rhead about her interest
l!l"pPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1

to pmchase property in the Mountain Home, and that she wanted vacant land with low taxes and
low maintenance. [R. Vol. III, p. 540]. All cOllli11Unications bet\veen the Browns as the seller
and Ms. Greenheart as the buyer \",ere conducted through the agent DalTyl Rhead. Id. Mr. Rhead
was both the listing and selling agent for the 60 acres that contained the adjudicated ground
water rights at issue in this case, however .Mr. Rhead did not testify at trial. [R. Vol. III, p. 54041].
On January 29, 2007, Defendant Greenheart and Jay Brown entered into a written
contract to pmchase approximately sixty (60) acres of the Original Brown Propelty (the
"Greenhemt Propelty") from the Browns, leaving the Browns with approxin1ately 260 acres (the
"CulTent Brown Propelty"). [R. Vol. III, p. 545-546]. The two written documents comprising the
contract between the parties include a RE-24 Vacant Land Real Estate Pmchase and Sale
Agreement and an RE-13 Counteroffer (collectively "Pmchase and Sale Agreement"). See.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No.6 in Exhibits to Clerk's Record; also found in [R. Vol. I, pp. 114-120].
Paragraph 16 ofthe Pmchase and Sale Agreement reads:
16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells springs,
water, ditches, ditch rights, etc. if any, that are appUltenant thereto that are now on
or used in connection with the premises and shall be included in the sale unless
otherwise provided herein:
[blank]
[R. Vol. III, p. 543]. Jay and Christine Brown reviewed the Purchase and Sale Agreement before
entering into the agreement. [R. Vol. III, p. 543]. Greenheart believed that when she signed the
Purchase and Sale Agreement that she expected to receive everything that came with the land.
[March 5-6,2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. p. 242, 11. 5-9].
Jay and Christine Brown executed a WalTanty Deed (See. Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 in Clerk's
Exhibits on Appeal; also found in [R. Vol. I, p. 29 and p. 121]) dated January 29, 2007
transfelTing the Greenheart Propelty to Ms. Greenheart. [R. Vol. III, p. 546]. The WalTanty
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Deed was recorded in the real prope11y records of Elmore County on January 30, 2007 as
Instmment # 384017. Id. The language in the Warranty Deed makes no mention of reserving
the adjudicated ground water rights and recites that the premises are conveyed "with their
appurtenances unto said Grantee and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever." Id.
The Wananty Deed was prepared by the title company, First American Title. [R. Vol.
III, p. 546]. Jay and Christine Brown had a full 0PPOl1unity to read the language ofthe Warranty
Deed and in fact reviewed the Warranty Deed before signing it. [R. Vol. III, p. 546].

(iii)

Course of Proceedings:

On AprilS, 2012, Plaintiffs Jay and Christine Brown filed their Complaint to quiet title on
adjudicated groundwater rights. [R. Vol. I, p. 11]. The Complaint only asked for a declaration
that the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Warranty Deed did not transfer water
with the sale of the Greenheart Prope11y and that Greenheal1 should be estopped from assel1ing
that a p0l1ion of the ground\vater rights were transferred to the Greenheart Propel1y. [R. Vol. I,
pp. 17-18]. On May 9,2012, Greenheart filed her Answer. [R. Vol. I, p. 63].
On

~ovember

15, 2012, Greenheart filed her Motion for SummalY Judgment, with

Supp0l1ing affidavits and memorandum, arguing that the statute of limitations on the Browns'
claim had mn and the Browns could not rely on equitable principles as a defense to Greenheart's
statute of limitations claims. [R. Vol. I, pp. 97-121]. The Browns filed a Cross-Motion for
SUl11l11a1Y Judgment on December 10, 2012, arguing that the adjudicated ground water rights

were never appurtenant to the Greenheart propel1y both paI1ies knew that that the groundwater
rights not part of the sale. [R. Vol. I, pp. 122-140].1 On December 21,2012, Greenheart filed her
Motion to Strike Portions of Jay Brown's and Terri LaRae Manduca's Affidavits, to preclude
I The affidavits of Jay Brown and Terri LaRae Manduca attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Summmy
Judgment, all pointed to extrinsic evidence in an attempt to show that the adjudicated ground water rights were not
conveyed with the sale of the Greenheart property. [R. Vol. I, pp. 142-166].
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extrinsic evidence from being introduced in order to interpret the unambiguous Warranty Deed
because fi'aud or mistake was never pled, let alone pled with pm1icularity as the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure require. [R. VoL II, pp. 322-329]. On that same day Greenhem1 flied a Response

ro Plail1T~ffs 'A10tion for SUllllllaJY Judgment, which argued once again that the cOUl1 should not
consider extrinsic evidence to explain the unambiguous Warranty Deed because the Brovms'
Complaint did not allege fi:aud or mistake and was not pled with particularity pursuant to
LR.C.P. 9(b). [R. Vol. II, pp. 286-296].
On December 24, 2012, the Browns filed their lv1emorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
A10tion for Summary Judgment which only included the arguments that both parties \yere aware

that the adjudicated ground water rights were not included in the sale of the Greenheart propelty,
the statute oflimitations had not run, and equitable estoppel was applicable to this case. [R. Vol.
II, pp. 330-342].2
On December 28,2012, Greenheart filed her Reply in Support of Defendant's Alotionfor
Suml17my Judgment which al1iculated that the adjudicated groundwater rights were transferred

through the appurtenance clause contained in Warranty Deed, the Plaintiffs applied the wrong
adverse possession statute of limitations, and that the four-year statute of limitation began to
accrue on the date the Warranty Deed was signed. [R. Vol II, pp. 343-348].
On December 31, 2012, Browns filed their Reply in Support of Plaintps' Motion for
Suml11my Judgment and Response in Opposition to Defendant's }v1otion to Strike Portions of
Affidavits of Jay B. Brovvl1 and Terri LaRea Manduca. [R. Vol II, p. 349]. The Reply and Motion

argued that the adjudicated water rights were not appurtenant to the Greenheart Property and the

The Plaintiffs in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's .Alotion for Summary Judgment never mentioned
any type of mistake had occurred, mutual or unilateraL

2
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Purchase and Sale Agreement's terms confirm that no water rights would be included in the sale.
[R. Vol. II, pp. 349-362].
A hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment was held on January 7,2013. The
district court entered its Order on Cross Motions for SW11l71my Judgment on January 31, 2013.
[R. Vol. II, p. 366]. In that order the district court denied Greenheart's motion to strike and
denied both parties' cross motions for summary judgment finding that material issues of fact
existed as to \vhether "there was a mutual mistake in the deed and whether the court may
consider extrinsic evidence for that purpose."

See Order On Cross "Motions For SUl11l11my

Judgment p. 10; [R. Vol. II, 375]. As such, the matter proceeded to trial set for March 5, 20l3.
Greenheart filed a .110tion for Reconsideration and SUPP0l1ing memorandum on February
15, 20l3. [R. Vol. II, p. 385 and p. 386]. Additionally, on February 15, 20l3, Greenhem1 filed a

Alation in Limine to Preclude Allegations of Mistake. [R. Vol. II, p. 398]. Both motions filed by
Greenheart raised the issues that the Brmvl1s' Complaint did not plead mistake, in the alternative
did not plead mistake with particularity and that the Browns should be precluded from asse11ing
a claim of 'mistake' and or precluded ii-om introducing extrinsic evidence to vary the language
of the Warranty Deed.
On February 21, 20l3, Browns filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in

Limine and "Motion for Reconsideration [R. Vol. II, 425] and a Motion to Amend [R. Vol. II, p.
408] seeking to amend their Complaint to add a claim for mutual mistake under Count 1. See.

[R. Vol. III, p. 417]. In response to Greenheart's arguments on reconsideration the Brovins
3

argued that the parties presented evidence on the cross motions for summary judgment that
allowed the cOUl1 to delve into the issue of mistake because, according to the Browns, the parties
had tried that issue by implication. [R. Vol. III, pp. 429-435].

3

The very extrinsic evidence that the Browns submitted via the affidavits that Greenheart objected to.
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The district court took up the parties' motion on February 22, 2013 during the court's
regularly scheduled pre-trial conference. After oral argument of the pal1ies the district court
denied Greenheart's motion for reconsideration and concluded that the Bro\\lJ1s' Complaint pled
mistake. The district comi held:
As to whether it relates to whether mistake \vas plead, \vhile I did not use that
heading, this is a notice pleading state. To that extent I think the paliy certainly
was on notice of what they were claiming in their claims, so I do find that it has
been plead with enough paliicularity in this paliicular case in the declaratory
judgment state to put the parties on notice that mistake is an issue.

See. [Transcript of February 22, 2013; Tr. p. 55,11. 15-22]. On the Browns' motion to mnend
their Complaint, the district court held:
As it relates to the motion to amend answer--or excuse me motion to amend the
complaint, the only reason for the motion to amend at this point--and quite frankly,
the motion was filed yesterday, so I haven't seen the proposed amendment, but if
all you're doing is putting the heading "mistake" on it, you don't need to do that
for the court's purpose. This is not a jury trial. This is a court trial. The court has
certainly read the pleading and is able to derive what has been pled.
To the extent you would be refi:aming those to allege new claims, it is untimely,
and it \vould prejUdice the other side, so to that extent, the motion to amend is
denied. To the extent that parties can amend a pleading any time up until they've
closed their case in chief, you can revisit that if you need, based on the evidence
that's presented.

See. [Transcript of February 22,2013; Tr. p. 56, 1. 20 thru p. 57,1. 11].
A court trial on the issue of whether there was a mistake was held on March 5 and 6,2013.
On May 10, 2013, the district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Directionsfor EntlY of Judgment [R. Vol. III, p. 537] fmding that a mutual mistake had OCCUlTed
between the parties and that the Browns were entitled to a judgment reforming the Warranty
Deed to exclude the ground water rights in dispute. The district court entered its Judgment on
May 23, 2013. Greenheart filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court ofIdaho on
June 27,2013. [R. Vol. III, p. 602].
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On May 31, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an application for Costs and Attomeys' Fees along with
supporting affidavit. [R. Vol. III, pp. 568-594].

On June 13, 2013, Greenhem1 filed her

Mcmorandum in Opposition to Plail1liffs . Application/or Costs andArrol71cys' Fces. [R. Vol. III,
p. 597]. Oral argument on the Bro\vns' request for attomey's fees and costs was held on August
5, 2013. [R. Vol. III, p. 609]. On August 7, 2013, the cOUIi issued its Mcmorandum Decision

and Order Granring in Part Plaint({!,s Fees and Costs. [R. Vol. III, p. 609]. The district COUIi
awarded the Brovvns their attomey's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) fmding that the
sale between the parties was a "commercial transaction."

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the district court err in permitting the Browns to try the issue of mutual
mistake?
B. Did the district court err in holding that the Browns' claims were not barred by the
applicable statute of limitations?
C. Did the district court err in not finding that the Browns were negligent and
therefore precluded from relying on mistake?
D. Did the district court err in holding that the Purchase and Sale Agreement was
ambiguous?
E. Did the district court err in finding that this case involved a 'commercial
transaction' and therefore attomey fees were awardable undel' Idaho Code Section
12-120(3)?
F. Is Greenheart entitled to an award of attomey fees on appeal?

II I
III
III
III
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ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review.
\Vhen questions of law are presented, the appellate cOUli is not bound by the findings of

the trial coun, but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented. Automobile
Club Ins. Co.

1'.

Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 876, 865 P.2d 965,967 (1993).

The date when a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law. C&G, Inc. v.
Canyon Highway Dist. Ho. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 PJd 194, 197 (2003). Therefore where

issues on appeal involve questions of law to the application of undisputed facts, an appellate
court exercises fee review. Attorney General of Canada on Behalf of Her }.1ajesty The Queen in
Right of Canada v. TysOH'sh, 118 Idaho 737, 739,800 P.2d 133,135 (et. App. 1990).

II.
The District Court Erred In Permitting The Browns To Try The Issue of Mutual
Mistake.
In denying the parties cross-motions for summ31Y judgment, the district court determined
that material issues of fact existed as to whether "there was a mutual mistake in the deed and
whether the COUlt may consider extrinsic evidence for that purpose."

See Order On Cross

Motions For Summmy Judgment p. 10; [R. Vol. II, p. 375]. The district court elTed in holding

that the Browns' Complaint requested equitable relief under a theory of 'mutual mistake' and
therefore should not have forced Greenheart to go to trial on that issue because (1) Browns did
not plead mistake in their Complaint; (2) assuming mistake was pled, it was not pled with
particularity and therefore did not comply with I.R.C.P. 9(b); and (3) Greenhe31't did not litigate
the issue of mutual mistake during the parties' cross motions for summary judgment through
express consent or by implication.

a.

The Browns' Complaint Did Not Plead Mutual Mistake.

The Browns never intended to rely on the legal theory of mutual mistake in their case
until the district court raised the issue for the first time in its Order On Cross Motions For
Summary Judgment. See. [R. Vol. II, p. 366]. The Complaint as well as Browns' written and

oral arguments on the parties cross motions for summary judgment and later the Browns' attempt
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

to amend the Complaint [R. Vo. II, pp. 408-422J all demonstrate that the Browns did not rely on
mutual mistake. Rather, the Browns sought a declaratory ruling to have the Purchase and Sale
Agreement and WalTanty Deed interpreted that the adjudicated ground water rights were never
transfelTed to Greenheart in the fIrst place when those respective documents were signed. That
requested remedy is very specifIc and not related to any remedy that could be granted under a
theory of mutual mistake.
This Court has recognized that "[t]he liberal construction of a complaint in notice
pleading is to avoid dismissal of an inm1fully drawn complaint that gives adequate notice of the
claims sought to be assel1ed." AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Inv. Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738-739, 101
P.3d 226, 231

232 (2004). However, the AMCO COUl1 also held that when the complaint is

specifIcally drafted to include specific claims and remedies, the party that drafted the complaint
is not allowed to assel1 more claims that were excluded from the complaint. The Al'JCO court
held" ... this principle is not applicable where there is a clearly drawn complaint that sets f011h
very specifIc claims and remedies." Id.
The Al'JCO case involved a declarat01Y action filed by an insurance company seeking a
declaration from the court that the insurance policy's exclusion for bodily injury arising out of
civil rights violations balTed business liability coverage for claims against the insured for
violation of Title VII. Id. at 140 Idaho 227-228. The insured argued that although the claims and
relief in the complaint were based on Title VII, the facts also revealed potential causes of action
for assault, battery, false in1prisonment, slander and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
at 140 Idaho 231. The AA1CO court disagreed with the insured's argument holding that the
complaint was very specifIc that it only sought claims and remedies arising under Title VII. Id. at
140 Idaho 232.
In this case, the Complaint did not plead mutual mistake and in fact the Complaint pled
legal theories to the exclusion of mutual mistake. The Complaint is completely devoid of the
word 'mistake' or any words synonymous with mistake.
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Moreover, the Complaint does not

request a remedy such as rescission or refOlmation, which are generally the remedies for mutual
mistake. See e.g.

O'Connor

1'.

Harger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 PJd 846, 851

(2008) (mutual mistake permits a party to rescind a contract); Bailey

1'.

Ewing, 105 Idaho 636,

64 L 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Ct. App. 1983) (instrument can be reformed to reflect the intentions of
the parties due to mutual mistake). Instead, the Complaint lays out the BrO\vns' legal stance that
the ground water never left the Browns' possession and therefore the appurtenance clause in the
Warranty Deed only created a rebuttable presumption that water could be transferred:
The facts and circumstances of the transaction by which Defendant purchased the
property from Plaintiffs, and the parties' subsequent conduct thereafter, establish
that any presumption that any portion of the Water Rights passed to Defendant
Greenhemi under the general appurtenancy clause of the W mTanty Deed is
conclusively rebutted by facts clem'ly demonstrating that it was known to both
parties that no pOliion of the Water Rights were intended to be conveyed, and
compel an interpretation of the purchase agreement and WmTanty Deed to the
effect that the Greenhemi Property was purchased and conveyed \vithout water
rights, but as dlY land.
Complaint ~ 27; [R. Vol. II, p. 17].
In the very next paragraph of the Complaint the Browns request velY specific relief in the fom1 of
a "judgment decreeing and declaring that the Purchase and Sale Agreement did not provide for
conveyance of any portion of the Water Rights, and that no portion of the Water Rights was in
fact conveyed by the W mTanty Deed to Defendant Greenhemi as an appUlienance to the
Greenheart Property ... "

Complaint

~

28(a); [R. Vol. II, p. 17].

There is no request for

refOlmation of the deed or rescission of the contract.
In fact, the oral and written arguments of the Browns during the parties' cross motions for
SUl11l11alY judgment clearly demonstrate that the Browns never intended to raise the legal theory
of mutual mistake. For example, in their memorandum in SUppOli of summary judgment, the
Browns' sole legal argument why the district court should consider 'extrinsic evidence' to
explain the Warranty Deed was not due to the parties making a mistake. Instead, the Browns
argued that the term "appurtenances" is ambiguous with respect to whether water rights are to be
necessarily included in a conveyance of land and therefore the result is to automatically consider
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extrinsic evidence. See. lvlemorandul11 In Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 13; [R.
Vol. I, p. 136].
In suppOli of their motion for summmy judgment, the Browns also submitted affidavits
from Jay Brown [R. Vol. I, p. 142J, TelTi Larae Manduca [R. Vol. I, p. 151J, and legal counsel
Tom Dvorak [R. Vol. I, p. 165J all of which contained extrinsic evidence.

This COUIi has

recognized that "[itJ is an elementary rule for the constlUction of deeds, the language of which is
plain and unambiguous, that, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the intention of the pmiies must
be ascertained from the instlUment itself ... Parol evidence is not admissible for such purpose."
Koon

I'.

Empey, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097, 1098 (1924). In response, to the Brovms' attempt to

use extrinsic evidence, Greenhemi specifically argued that fraud or mistake was not pled by the
Browns and therefore extrinsic evidence could not be considered. Applying the Empey decision
and the parol evidence rule to the facts of this case, Greenheart's memorandum opposing
summmy judgment stated:
More importantly, the exception to the pm'ol evidence lUle (fraud or mistake) that
\\'ould permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence has never been pled by
BroVl'11s. Brovm's Complaint does not allege fraud or mistake and certainly does
not meet LR.C.P. 9(b) requiring that fraud or mistake be pled with pmiiculm·ity.
As a result, the extrinsic evidence Brown attempts to introduce (\vhich Greenhemi
currently challenges in her motion to strike filed concurrently) as the foundation
for their motion cannot be a basis for granting summmy judgment.
See Memorandum in Opposition to
pp. 290-291].

Plaint~fJs

'Motion for SummaJY Judgment pp. 5-6: [R. Vol. II,

The Browns could have responded in writing to Greenheart's argument that

mistake had in fact been pled, but the Browns did not do so. Not once in all of the written
pleadings and affidavits leading up to oral argument on the cross motions for summmy judgment
did the Browns say they were or had pled mistake.
Likewise, during oral argument on the motion in limine and cross motions for summary
judgment, counsel for Greenhemi once again reiterated that the Browns had not pled fraud or
mistake in the Complaint:
.Mr. Villegas: If you don't exclude water from the deed, the water goes with the
land. That's what our courts have held. And, of course, again, the Empey case,
absent fraud or mistake. And there's been no allegations of fraud or mistake in
APPELLA.NT'S BRIEF - 11

this case, and there have been no allegations of mistake in this case, which has to
be specifically pled.
[Transcript of January 7, 2013; Tr. p. 20,11. 6012].
Again, the rebuttal by counsel for the Browns never responded that mutual mistake had in fact
been pled. One would reasonably presume that had Brown intended to rely on a theory of mutual
mistake some statement would have been made at oral argument rebutting Greenheart's
objections. This is perhaps the most telling argument that the Browns never intended to litigate
the issue of whether there was a mutual mistake. Rather than address mutual mistake, the Browns
stuck to their legal theory (as set forth in the Complaint) that it was a rebuttable presumption
whether water transfelTed to GreenheaI1 in the first place and that it had not. Counsel for the
Browns argued:
Mr. Creamer: The first legal question that the court needs to answer is, were the
\vater rights appUl1enant to these 60 acres in the first place at the time of conveyance?
.. Was there water under a water right being beneficially used on the land? In this
case, for in-igation purposes, was that land ilTigated at the time of the conveyance?

[Transcript of January 7, 2013; Tr. pg. 21, 11. 6-16].

***
:Mr. Creamer: Your Honor, we would submit that it is clearly undisputed that
there was no water used on this property. It's desert land today. It was desert 1all d
then. It was desert until, clear back to 1986 when my clients acquired the
propeliy.

So whether the water right was appUl1enant to the land is a legal question the court
can determine, and we'd submit that the water right was not appurtenant to the
land, notwithstanding there was a partial decree issued seven years previous to this
conveyance ...
[Transcript ofJanuary 7, 2013; Tr. p. 22, 11. 4-13].
The oral argument quoted above, demonstrates that the Browns did not plead mistake in
their Complaint because the Browns did not intend to use mutual mistake as one of their legal
theories for recovery. The record on appeal demonstrates that the Complaint was clearly drawn
asking for specific claims and remedies to the exclusion of other remedies. Therefore, the district
court erred in concluding that mistake had been pled by the Browns.
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Finally, the Browns' Response in Opposiriol1

TO

DefendanT's A-1oriol1 to Shorten Time to

Hear Her Motions for Reconsideration and ]"fofion in Limine [R. Vol. II, p. 425] should leave no

doubt that the Browns did not plead mistake. The arguments contained in that opposition brief
never ackno\vledged that the Brmvns pled mistake. Rather, the opposition brief argues that was
impliedly tried on the cross motions for sunu11ary judgment. See. [R. Vol. II, pp. 427-434]. Had
the Browns truly believed that they pled mistake, they would not have had to argue that the issue
was impliedly tried, or that the Complaint was insufficient and needed to be amended. The
Clerk's record on appeal refutes the Browns' arguments and is addressed below.
b. Mistake was not pled with particularity.
Assuming this Com1 agrees with the district com1 that the Browns pled mistake in the
Complaint, Greenheart asks that this Com1 hold that the dishict com1 elTed in allowing the
Browns to litigate the issue of mutual mistake because the Complaint \vas not pled with
particularity.
The general policy behind the CUlTent rules of civil procedure is to provide evelY litigant
\vith his or her day in com1. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 751-752,274 P.3d
1256, 1266 - 1267 (2012). The purpose of a complaint is to infonn the defendant of the material
facts upon which the plaintiff bases his action. Id. A complaint need only contain a concise
statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief. Id. In some cases,
a heightened pleading requirement may be imposed by rule such as actions alleging mistake and
therefore must be stated with paI1icularity. Id.; I.R.c.P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) states in pe11inent part:
"In all averment of fraud or mistake ... the circUlllstances constituting fraud or mistake ... shall be
stated with particularity." I.R.c.P. 9(b).
In a case addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff had pled fraud with particularity, the
court in Strate v. Cambridge Telephone Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 157, 161,795 P.2d 319, 323 (Ct.
App. 1990) held that the complaint did not adequately plead fraud because: (1) the complaint did
not mention fraud by name and (2) the plaintiff failed to allege one of the elements of fraud:
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The circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity in the
pleading. LR.C.P. 9(b); Theriault 1'. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303, 698
P.2d 365 (1985). The elements of fraud are: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's know ledge of its falsity; (5) the
speaker's intent that the representation will be acted upon in a reasonably
contemplated manner; (6) the listener's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the listener's
reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the listener's right to rely on the
truth of the representation; and (9) the listener's consequent and proximate injmy.
Gala.,-), Outdoor Adl'ertising Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Department, 109 Idaho
692,710 P.2d 602 (1985). In this case, Cambridge failed to mention fraud by
name or to allege that the Strates' representations ,,,ere knowingly false when
made. Consequently, we must agree with the trial court that the fraud issue
was not framed by an adequate pleading.
Strate v. Cambridge Telephone Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 157, 161,795 P.2d 319, 323 (Ct. App.

1990)(underlining and bolding added).
Similar to fraud, the facts and circumstances constituting the mistake must be pled with
particularity. See. I.R.C.P. 9(b). A "mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from
ignorance, smprise, or misplaced confidence." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d
1099, 1102 (Ct. App. 1983). A mutual mistake occms when both parties share a misconception
about a vital fact upon which they based their bargain at the time of contracting. Id. The mistake
must be material or, in other words, so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the
parties. Id.
In this case, similar to the complaint in the Strate v. Cambridge case, the Brov,1]1s'
Complaint suffers from the same pleading deficiencies. First, the Complaint does not use the
word' mistake', 'mutual mistake' or any words synonymous with mistake and therefore mistake
was not identified by name in the Complaint. Second, a review of the Complaint shows that none
of the allegations detail with particularity (1) what the mistake or common misconception was;
and (2) how or why the mistake \vas so substantial and fundamental that it defeated the object of
the parties. It cannot be said that the Browns' Complaint pled mistake with particularity. Since
mistake was not properly pled, the district court ened in allowing the Browns to litigate the issue
of whether there was a mutual mistake.
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c. Greenheart did not try the issue of whether mutual mistake existed in this
case either through express or implied consent at any time during the
course of proceedings.
All throughout the SUnU11aIY judgment phase and even leading up to trial, GreenheaI1
maintained her objection that the Browns did not plead mistake and if they did, mistake was not
pled \vith pm1icularity in the Complaint. Therefore it cannot be said that Greenhem1 tried the
issue of mutual mistake expressly or by implication. Based on the analysis in subsections "a"
and "b" above, the district court should not have forced Greenhem1 to defend against a legal
theOlY that the Browns did not ask for.
Generally, issues not raised in the pleadings yet tried by express or implied consent of the
parties moe to be treated as if as though they had been raised in the pleadings.

Collins v.

Parhns071, 96 Idaho 294, 527 P.2d 1252 (1974); See also LR.C.P. 15(b) ("\Vhen issues not raised

by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the pm1ies, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings"). The requirement that the unpled issues be
tried by at least the implied consent of the paI1ies assures that the pm1ies have notice of the issues
before the cOUli and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and m"gument. lvi K.
Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 349-350, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 - 1197 (1980).
The case of Collins v. Parhnso71 was a quiet title action where appellant argued that the
trial cOUli en"ed in refon11ing a quit claim deed due to mutual mistake. Collins at Idaho 296. The
basis for appellant's argument was that mutual mistake was not presented by the pleadings. Id.
The Collins court held that the pm1ies tried the issue by implication because the appellants did
not object, "The record indicates no objection to the inquiries as to the issue of mistake in
preparation of the quitclaim deed. Therefore the issue was properly raised at trial."!d. Based on
the Collins court's reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude that had the appellant objected to the
inquiries as to the issues of mistake, then the issue would not have been tried by implication.
In this case, Greenheart did not try the issue of mistake expressly or by implication during
summary judgment.

As discussed above, Greenheart's pleadings in opposition to BroVvTIS'

motion for summmy judgment and pleadings on her motion to strike were premised on the fact
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that the Browns did not allege fraud or mistake and therefore the extrinsic evidence offered in
support of BroVl'lls' motion for summary judgment was baITed by the parol evidence lUle.
Greenhearfs memorandum opposing the BroVl'l1s' motion for summary judgment stated:
More importantly. the exception to the parol evidence lUle (fraud or mistake) that
would permit the introduction of extlinsic evidence has never been pled by
Browns. Brown's Complaint does not allege fraud or mistake and cel1ainly does
not meet LR.C.P. 9(b) requiring that fi-aud or mistake be pled with pm1icularity.
As a result the extrinsic evidence Bmvm attempts to introduce (which Greenheart
currently challenges in her motion to strike filed concurrently) as the foundation
for their motion cannot be a basis for granting sununary judgment.
See Memorandum ;'1 Opposition to Plaintiffs' A1ori0l1 for SUl17mm), Judgment pp. 5-6; [R. Vol. II,

pp. 290-291]. Greenhem1 likewise argued in her Reply A1emorandul11 In Support of Defendant 's
~Motio71

for Summary Judgment [R. Vol. II, p. 343] that "Brown has not alleged fraud or mistake

that would allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence to change the express intent in the
WmTanty Deed." [R. Vol. II, p. 345]. Greenheart's arguments on both of these briefs are a clear
expression by Greenheart that mistake was not pled by the Browns and that Greenhem1 did not
try the issue of mutual mistake by express consent or by implication.
The next opportunity for Greenheart to object to the Browns' failure to plead mistake
occurred during oral argument on the parties' cross motion for summary judgment.
~1r. Villegas: If you don't exclude water from the deed, the water goes with the
land. That's what our courts have held. And, of course, again, the Empey case,
absent fraud or mistake. And there's been no allegations of fraud or mistake in
this case, and there have been no allegations of mistake in this case, which has to
be specifically pled.

[Transcript of January 7, 20l3; Tr. p. 20, 11. 6012]. In fact, Greenheart's legal counsel was
careful to preface on the record that Greenheart was not trying by implication the issue of mutual
mistake when legal counsel explained Greenheart's post sale conduct which the Browns had used
as extrinsic evidence in an effort to show a contrary intent from the plain language of the
Warranty Deed:

Mr. Villegas: And, again I want to be velY careful here because I understand
there's also case law where parties can, even when one party doesn't plead
something, it may be impliedly tried, but I do want to just note for the record
again, could this have been a mistake, a mutual mistake by the parties? Maybe.
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But the plaintiffs have not pled that, and our rules of civil procedure require the
parties to plead mistake --just like fraud-- with pm1icularity, and so out of an
abundance of caution, I need to say that, but I do at least \vant to explain \vhat
[Greenheal1] meant in her affidavit when she said --no one ever told her that there
was a groundwater right or it was excluded from the sale of the property.
And so there are --should the court consider I\1s. Greenhearfs post-sale conduct,
we submit, that there are issues of fact here, and, certainly the plaintiffs m'e not
entitled to summary judgment. Thank you.
[Transcript of January 7, 2013; Tr. p. 34, 11. 17-35 thm p. 35,11. 1-9].
Even after the district court ordered the pal1ies to go to trial on the issue of whether a mutual
mistake had occurred, Greenheart continued to lodge her objection that the Browns' Complaint
did not plead mistake and if they did, mistake was not pled with pm1iculm·ity. Greenhem1 filed
her ivfotion for Reconsideration [R. Vol. II, p. 384] and Supp011ing Memorandwll [R. Vol. II, p.
386] as well as her Defendant'5 Motion In Limine To Preclude Allegations of Mistake [R. Vol. II,
p.398].
Based on the forgoing analysis, Greenhem1 respectfully requests that this Com1 hold that
the district com1 erred in finding as a matter of law, that the Browns' Complaint pled mistake or
that the Complaint met the requirements of LR.C.P. 9(b) that mutual mistake be pled with
particularity. As such, the district cow1 erred in allowing the Browns to litigate the issue of
mutual mistake at trial.

III. The District Court Erred In Not Holding That The
The Statute of Limitations.

Browns~

Claims Were Barred By

The district court ened in holding that the Browns' declaratory/quiet title action was not
barred by either the four yem' statute limitations of Idaho Code 5-224 or the five year statute of
limitations ofIdaho Code 5-216. Alternatively, if this Com1 detelmines that mutual mistake was
properly pled and was a viable claim for the Browns, the district court erred in holding that the
three year statute of limitations set f011h in Idaho Code 5-218(4) had not run on the mutual
mistake claim.
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a. The Browns' action to interpret the 'Varranty Deed is barred by the four-year
statute of limitations of Idaho Code 5-224.
The Browns' Complaint requested the com1 to interpret the Warranty Deed to mean that
the Deed did not include the sale and transfer of ground water. Such an action is governed by the
applicable four-year statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code Section 5-224.
Idaho Code Section 5-224 is the general four-year statute of limitations, "}\n action for
reliefnot hereinbefore provided for must be conm1enced within four (4) years after the cause of
action shall have accrued." I.e. § 5-224. Cnder Idaho law, a cause of action generally "accrues,"
and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another.
Galbraith

1'.

Vangas, Inc., 103 Idaho 912, 915, 655 P.2d 119, 122 (Ct. App.1982). See also

Corbridge

1'.

Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1986) (Cause of action

does not accrue until aggrieved paI1y suffers damages.). The statute of limitations may only be
asse11ed as a bar after the expiration of the statutory period following the accrual of the cause of
action. City of St. Anthony 1'. Mason, 49 Idaho 717,291 P. 1067 (1930).
It has long been recognized by Idaho courts that "a water right is an appm1enance to the
land on which it has been and \vill pass by conveyance of the land." Russell v. Irish, 118 P. 501,
502 (1911). "Unless [water rights] are e)...rpressly reserved in the deed or it is clearly shown that
the parties intended that the grantor would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with the
land even though they are not mentioned in the deed and the deed does not mention
'appurtenances.'" Bagley v. 17lOmason, 149 Idaho 799, 803,241 P.3d 972,976 (2010) quoting
Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 14, 156 P.3d 502, 515 (2007). It has been

held that the use of the expression '''together with all and singular the appurtenances thereto
belonging and appertaining,' or one of similar purport ... " in a deed is effective to transfer an
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appurtenant water right unless there

IS

a specific reservation in the deed.

K0071 1'.

Empey, 40

Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097, 1099 (1924).
In this case, the peninent pmis of the WmTanty Deed to Greenhemi fi.-om the Brovms read
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said premises, with their appurtenances urlto the said Grantee ..
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 8 in Clerk's Exhibits on Appeal; also found in [R. Vol. I, p. 29 and p.

121]. The Warranty Deed contains the typical "appurtenance" language effective to transfer the
ground water. Thus, when the Browns executed the \Varranty Deed to Greenhemi on Januarv
29. 2007, the ground water rights were likewise transfelTed to Greenheart as well. At that point
the BroV\'11s' cause of action accrued because they could have filed their declaratory/quiet title
action against Greenhemi the very next day seeking to undo the ground water rights transfer.
Instead, the Browns, waited more than four years to bring this lawsuit filing their Complaint on
April 5, 2012. [R. Vol. I, p. 11]. Based on the undisputed facts in the record on appeal,
Greenhemi respectfully requests that this COUli find that the district cOUli erred in not finding
that the Browns' lawsuit was bmTed by the statute of limitations.

4

b. Browns' mutual mistake claim is barred by the statute of limitations found in
Idaho Code Section 5-218.
Assuming this COUli determines that the Browns could maintain their lawsuit under a
theory ofmutual mistake, the evidence at trial establishes that the Browns could have and should
have discovered the mistake within the earlier of three years from the date the Complaint was

4 Although the Brovl11s' Complaint also sought declaratory relief to interpret the Purchase and Sale
Agreement the Doctrine of Merger dictates that "[w]hen a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the
contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the terms of the deed may vary from those contained
in the contract, the deed alone must be looked to determine the rights of the parties .... " Capstar Radio Operating Co.
11. Lmvrence, 143 Idaho 704,710,152 P.3d 575,581 (2007). As such, the five year statute of limitations governing
written contracts found in Idaho Code Section 5-216 would not apply. However, assuming that Section 5-216
applied, the Browns' lawsuit would still be untimely under the five year statute of limitations because the contract
and counteroffer were not signed until January 9,2007. See [R. Vol. II, p. 120]. To be timely \vithin five years the
Complaint would have to have been filed on or before January 9,2012.
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filed.

Specifically, the Browns should have discovered the mistake when they signed the

Warranty Deed. The district cOUl1 en'ed in holding that the Browns could not have discovered
the mistake at that point.
The statute of limitations on the ground of fi'aud or mistake must be commenced within
three (3) years. I.C § 5-218. Section 5-218 states that a cause of action for fi'aud or mistake
does not accrue "until discovery, by the aggrieved pm1y, of the facts constituting the fi'aud or
mistake," 1d.

In the conte:>.i of fraud, "our Supreme Court has held that 'actual knowledge of

the fi'aud will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved pm1y could have discovered it by the exercise
of due diligence,'"

Aitken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 901, 702 P.2d 1360, 1361 (CL App. 1985)

(quoting Nancy Lee 1.,1ines,lnc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828,829 (1973)). The
Airken COUl1 held that this same principle applies to causes of action based upon mistake:
We believe the same principle logically applies to causes of action based
upon mistake. Accordingly, we hold that an action seeking relief from
mistake will be time-barred under I.C. § 5-218(4) unless it is filed within
three vears after the mistake could have been discovered in the exercise
of due diligence.
1d. (underlining and bolding added).

Thus, the Brov,lJ1s' claim for mutual mistake would be

barred by the three year statute of limitations of § 5-218(4) if the record shows (as Greenheart
had argued at trial) that the Browns could have discovered the mistake at the tin1e they signed the
Warranty Deed on January 29,2007.
The holding in the Nancy Lee Mines case is particularly applicable to this case.

Nancy

Lee Mines involved an action by class representatives for stock holders of Nancy Lee Mines, Inc.
seeking to recover sales of certain stock alleging fraud and illegal procedures surrounding the
sale of said stock. 1d. at 95 Idaho 546. The appellant-class representatives argued on appeal that
there was substantial and competent evidence of fraud by the manager and attorney for Nancy
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Lee Mines that should have delayed the !Unning of the statute of limitations. The Nancy Lee

Mines court held that the statute of limitations ran because the stockholders had access to the
corporate records regarding the sale and therefore the means of knowledge was equivalent to
actual knowledge. Id. at 95 Idaho 547.

The relevant p011ion of the Nancy Lee Mines decision

reads:
As noted in I.e. s 5-218, the statute does not begin to !Un in fraud cases 'until the
discovery' of the fraud. However, actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred
if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due
diligence. It is unnecessary to consider the issue of whether or not there was any
ii-aud (actual or const!Uctive) in this case. If there was any fraud it could have
been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time it was alleged
to have been committed.
The reasoning of the Washington Supreme COUl1 in Davis v. Hanison [25
Wash.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015 (1946)] is applicable in this case:
'We hold that this action was barred by the three year statute of limitations,
whether appellants had actual knowledge of the various transactions or not, for
the reason that the facts were open and appeared upon the records of the
corporation, subject to inspection by stockholders. If the stockholders failed to
examine the corporate records. they must have been negligent and careless of
their own interests. The means of knowledge were open to them. and means of
know ledge are equivalent to actual knowledge.'

Id. (underlining and bolding added).
Here, the Browns should have discovered the mistake at the time they signed the
Warranty Deed and therefore the statute of limitations should have begun to !Un at that time. As
previously stated, "Unless [water rights] are expressly reserved in the deed or it is clearly shown
that the parties intended that the grantor would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with
the land even though they are not mentioned in the deed and the deed does not mention
'appurtenances.' " Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 803, 241 P.3d 972, 976 (2010) quoting

Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1,14,156 P.3d 502,515 (2007). It is undisputed
the Browns read the Wananty Deed before signing it. See. Finding of Fact No. 17; [R. Vol. III,
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546].

The Warranty Deed was not prepared by Greenhem1 but ,vas prepared by the title

company. See. Findings of Fact No. 16; [R. Vol. III, p. 546].
Like the shareholders in the Nancy Lee lvlines case, the means of knowledge were open to
the Browns with respect to whether the WmTanty Deed contained exclusionary language
excepting the ground water :Ii-om the transfer of the real prope11y. The district c0U11 however
focused its analysis on ,vhether the Browns could understand what the legal significance of the
phrase "with their appurtenances" meant to detel111ine whether the Brovms could have
discovered the mistake with due diligence. Greenhem1 respectfully disagrees with the district
court's analysis. The focus should have been on the fact that the WmTanty Deed did not have
anv lanQ"uaQ"e reserving or otherwise exceptinQ" water ii-om the transfer of the real prope11v.
Greenheart cannot find any Idaho cases that require special 'legal' language to accomplish that
goal. Therefore, any language such as "Water not inc! uded" or "water not part of the transfer" or
"excepting water £l'om" or "Water right No. 61-2188 and 61-7151 excluded" or any multitude of
exclusionary phrases vwuld have been sufficient to exclude the ground water.

Nothing

prevented the Browns £l'om reading the missing language nor were the Browns prevented £l'om
having an attorney review the Warranty Deed. The Brovvns were 'negligent and careless of their
own interests' at the tin1e they read and signed the Warranty Deed and therefore the district court
should have held that the statute of limitations stmied to mn on January 29, 2007 the date the
Browns signed the Wananty Deed.
Alternatively, there are two other instances where the Browns could have discovered the
mistake. First, upon exercise of due diligence, the Browns could have and should have noticed
that the tenns of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and in particular Paragraph 16, clearly stated
that water was included in the sale of the prope11y. See. Purchase and Sale Agreement
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~

16,

Plaintiffs Exhibit No.6: also found in [R. Vol. I, p. 117]. So at the tin1e the BrO\vns read and
signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement they could have discovered the mistake.
Second, the trial testimony established that when Jay Broyvn was assisting Greenheart
with her tax assessments, Jay Brown knew that either through the assessor or fi:om Greenhemi
herself that the Elmore County Assessor's office had levied the Greenhemi Property as irrigated
land. See. [March 5-6.2013 Trial Transcript: Tr. p. 83,1. 18 thm p. 84,1. 24] and [Tr. pp. 104108].

That fact should have put Jay Brovln on notice that something had caused the assessor's

office to consider the Greenheart Propeliy as irrigated ground yet Jay Brown did nothing to
investigate why the assessor would tax GreenheaIi'S property under that classification. In the
exercise of due diligence, Jay Brown could have discovered that something could be \\Tong with
the Warranty Deed at that time. This time frame again is beyond the 3 year statute of limitations.
In closing, Greenheart asks this Comi to consider the policy and legal ramifications if this
Court were to affirm the district court's legal analysis on the statute of limitations for mistake.
According to the district comi, the Browns could not have, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, discover the mistake until they spoke to their attorney Mr. Creamer. See. pp. 22-23 of

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Lmv and Directions For Entry of Judgment; [R. Vol. III, pp.
558-559]. Based on that legal holding the time period of discovery could continue for decades
before an aggrieved party speaks to an attorney. The law in Idaho should be that in cases where
it is alleged that a deed mistakenly conveyed water rights with land, the aggrieved paI1y is
deemed to have the ability to discover that mistake at the time of signing the deed. That is
because all that is needed to reserve the water is the use of simple non legalistic language stating
that water is not part of the conveyance. Such a holding will provide celiainty in real propeliy
transactions and prevent potential claims to water from popping up several years later and save
the transferee from costly litigation defending against a seller who now alleges a mistake.
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IV. The Browns '''ere Negligent In Protecting Their Interests and Therefore Cannot Use
The Theory of Mistake to Excuse Their Negligence.
In Defendant's First Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R
Vol. II, p. 502] Greenheart requested that the Court find that Jay and Christine Brown were
negligent in reviewing the WalTanty Deed. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a pm1y will
not be relieved from the terms of a contract on the grounds of mistake due to his negligence when
it was within the parties' power to include a provision in the contract that ,vould have protected
their interest. Jensen v ..McConnell Bros. et al, 31 Idaho 87, 88, 169 P. 292, 293 (1917).
Jensen involved a dispute over the payment of a promissory note given as part of the
consideration for the purchase of certain land and a water right. Id. at 31 Idaho 87. For the
purpose of fmally settling all disputes, the pm1ies entered into a written contract wherein the
appellant agreed to extend time of payment of the note. Id. The settlement agreement contained
a general release clause that released each party of, "all claims, offsets, set-offs, and
counterclaims, choses in action, causes of action, debts, remedies, or rights to money, propeliy,
damages, or legal or equitable relief that it, they, or either of them, has or have against the party
of the first pmi at the date of this agreement or at any time heretofore." At trial, respondent
argued that the settlement agreement was never intended to include any waiver of respondent's
claim regarding water rights and therefore, the respondent attempted to introduce oral evidence to
demonstrate a contrary intent from the written telms of the settlement agreement. Id. at 31 Idaho
88. The trial comi allowed respondent to present oral evidence and ultimately entered judgment
in favor of respondent.
On appeal, the Jensen court reversed the trial court's judgment and held that the oral
evidence should have been excluded. The Jensen court reasoned:
Where a release is contractual and general in its telms and there is no limitation by
way of recital or otherwise, the releasor may not prove an exception by parol.
Nor will one be relieved from the terms of a contract on the ground of mistake due
to his negligence when it was within his power to have a stipulation inserted in the
agreement which would have fully protected him. He is bound to assume any risk
he might have provided against in the contract.
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Jd. (internal citations omitted). The Jensen cOUl1 noted that the respondent testified that they had

read the instrument before signing it and therefore, based upon the rule of law established above,
the trial court should have excluded the oral evidence.
The respondent in the Jensen case was certainly mistaken as to the effect the legal
language contained within the release would have over their ability to assert their rights to the
water. Neve11heless, the Jensen court held that because respondent could have protected their
interest in the agreement by inse11ing language reserving their right to pursue the water, and did
not do so, they were "negligent" in protecting their interests. Therefore, the respondent was not
relieved from the tel111S of the contract on the grounds of mistake.
In this case, the District Court addressed the issue of the Brovv11s' negligence in revie\\~ng
the Warranty Deed only in the context of the statute oflimitations. The district com1 held:
It is clear from the evidence that the Browns read the Warranty Deed before they
signed the deed but did not attach the weight legal significance to three words
'\\~th their appurtenances" that these words actually carry. They obtained the
assistance of a licensed realtor to assist with the sale and the assistance of a
professional title company to assist in the document preparation. The Defendant
would like for this court to rule that not understanding these three words was
"negligence" or that not obtaining legal counsel to provide advice on its legal
significance was "negligence." Although many states require licensed legal
advice before a real estate closing, this com1 will not hold that to be the law in
Idaho or find that the absence oflegal advice at closing is negligence per se. This
is not an issue of negligence but rather whether the Browns could have discovered
the mistake in the exercise of due diligence.
[R. Vol. III, p. 557] (italics in original). The district cOUl1, hmvever, should have determined
whether the Browns' negligence barred them from relying on mistake to reform the Warranty
Deed at all.
As previously discussed, all that a pm1y needs to do to exclude appurtenant water from
the transfer of real propel1y is to use any fOlm of wording/language reserving the water from the
transfer. No specific legalistic language is required so long as there is a clear indication that
water is being reserved or excluded. Like the respondent in Jensen, the Browns could have
inse11ed language into the Warranty Deed to protect their interest in the ground water rights.
Similarly, like the respondent in Jensen the Browns read the Warranty Deed placed in front of
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them See. Finding of Fact No. 17; [R. Vol. III, 546] and could plainly see that exclusionary
language was missing. The water rights were presumably so impOliant that they hired a real
estate agent and title company to assist with the sale of the land and yet, they chose not to have a
lawyer review the W31Tanty Deed. Failing to do so was negligent and therefore the district court
should have concluded that the Browns could not use mistake to refol1n the WalTanty Deed.
V. The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Purchase and Sale Agreement Was
Ambiguous.
In finding that the Browns proved mutual mistake by clear and convincing evidence, the
district court held that the Putchase and Sale Agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit No.6 in Exhibits to
Clerk's Record; also found in [R Vol. I, pp. 114-120]) was subject to two reasonable
interpretations and therefore the contract ,vas ambiguous. As such, the district cOUli looked to
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. See. pp. 6-10 of Findings of Fact Conclusions

of Lav, and Directions For EntlY of Judgment; [R. Vol. III, pp. 542-546]. The district cOUli ened
in holding that the Purchase and Sale Agreement and specifically, Paragraph 16 of the Agreement
made the contract ambiguous.
Vvnen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and legal
effect are questions of law. Lamprecht v. Jordan, IIC, 139 Idaho 182, 185-186, 75 P.3d 743,
746 - 747 (2003). An unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning. Id. A contract is
ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. In detemlining the intent
of the p31iies, a comi will view the contract as a whole. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dis!.,
134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000).
In this case, the plain language of the telms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement state that
water was included in the sale of the propeliy. The Purchase and Sale Agreement specifically
reads:
16. WATER RIGHTS: Description of water rights, water systems, wells springs,
water, ditches, ditch rights, etc. if any, that are appurtenant thereto that are now on
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or used in connection with the premises and shall be included in the sale unless
otherwise provided herein:
[blank]
See Plaintiff s Exhibit 6 in Clerk's Exhibits on Appeal: [R. Vol. I, pp. 114-120]. The district

coun held that the use of the semicolon made paragraph 16 ambiguous subject to more than one
interpretation because it meant water could be excluded somewhere else within the Purchase and
Sale Agreement. [R. Vol. III, p. 544].

The district court was incorTect. The phrase "shall be

included unless otherwise provided herein" directs that in order to exclude water ii-om the sale,
the water would luve to be identified within paragraph 16.
Even if this Court were to agree with the district COUlt that the semicolon meant water
could be excluded someplace else in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the rest of that contract
has absolutely no reference to water being excluded. The district cOUlt incorrectly relies on the
use of words NIA (not applicable) in Paragraph 6e as well as the 'costs' box in Paragraph 21 of
the Purchase and Sale Agreement to mean that water rights were excluded fi-om the sale. The
words "not applicable" mean just that, not applicable. It does not tell Greenheart that there was
an adjudicated ground water right related to the property and it is excluded from the sale. The
same result applies to the' costs' box in Paragraph 21. All Paragraph 21 identifies is which party
will pay certain costs prior to closing.

The Purchase and Sale Agreement is unambiguous as a

matter of law-Paragraph 16 specifically included any appUltenant water with the sale of the
property.
VI. The District Court Erred Awarding Browns Attorney Fees.

The district COUlt awarded the Browns attomey fees as the prevailing party under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) finding that both parties entered into the purchase and sale agreement for a
commercial transaction. 5 The district court erred because: (1) the evidence produced at trial

If this Court reverses the district court on appeal, then attorney fees awarded to the Browns would be improper
because the Browns would not be the prevailing party.

5
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established that Greenhear1 did not have a commercial purpose for the purchase; and (2) there
was no evidence at all regarding whether the Browns had a commercial purpose for selling the
property.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for an award of attomey fees to the prevailing par1y in a
civil action to recover "in any commercial transaction." A commercial transaction includes aU
transactions except those for personal or household purposes. Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co .. Inc.,
152 Idaho 741, 755-756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270-1271 (2012); I.e. § 12-120(3). In determining
whether attomey fees should be awarded under I.e. § 12-120(3), the Idaho Supreme C0U11 has
conducted a two-step analysis: "(1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the
claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought."

Garner v. POl'ey, 151 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608,615 (2011). It is imp 011 ant to note that an
award ofattomey fees under § 12-120(3) requires that the lawsuit and the causes of action must
be based on a commercial transaction, not sin1ply a situation that can be characterized as a
commercial transaction. "Vie today make clear that, in order for a transaction to be commercial,
each pa11v to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial purpose." Carrillo v.

Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 756,274 P.3d 1256, 1271 (2012)(underlining added). In the
Carrillo case the Idaho Supreme Court held that the "Can-iUos transacted with Boise Tire in
order to obtain services for their personal vehicle and there is no indication that they intended to
use the benefit of those services for a commercial purpose. The transaction here at issue therefore
lacked the symmetry of commercial purpose necessary to trigger I.e. § 12-120(3), and the
district c0U11 properly denied the CarTillos' request for attomey fees."

a.

There is no evidence that Greenheart purchased the land for a commercial
purpose.

In this case, the district court misconstrued the evidence regarding Greenheart's
purpose/intentions for buying the property.
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The district court referred to its finding of fact

number 12 [R. Vol. III, p. 540J where it held that Greenheart " .. wanted to invest in real estate in
Mountain Home" along with the finding that Greenheart also wanted low taxes.

MemorandullJ Decision and Order Granting In Part

Plaint~frs

See.

Fees and Costs p. 9; [R. Vo. III,

p. 617]. The district COUlt also based its determination of conm1ercial transaction on the letter
that Greenhemt had written to the Elmore County Assessor that read: "At the time of my
purchase, I was very aware that my parcel is strictly for farming and that I had no way to build a
residence." Id.

Considering all those findings together, the district court concluded that "She

bought the property as an investment, not for household or personal reasons."

See.

Memorandulll Decision and Order Granting In Part Plail1l~frs Fees and Costs p. 10; [R. Vo. III,
p. 618]. Those specific findings however do not establish that Greenheart had a commercial
purpose for purchasing the property.
Nowhere in Greenheart's testimony at trial did she say that she intended to 'invest'
propelty in Mountain Home. The relevant pOltions of Greenheart's testimony were as follows:

Mr. Dvorak:
.. Tell the court, if you would, how you becmne interested in
purchasing this piece of propelty.
Ms. Greenheart: Yes. My mother passed away and left some money, so I
wanted to have some land, so I had the Realtor who helped to buy the one in
Emmett, and he, I asked him to look around so he gave me a list of it, vacant land.

[March 5-6, 2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. p. 129, 11. 16-21].

***
Mr. Dvorak: And isn't it true that when you were looking for property in Idaho,
you thought you might want to live here again?
Ms. Greenheart: Yes. I still am entertaining that idea.
Mr. Dvorak: And you mentioned vacant land as part of the instructions that you
gave to the Realtor?
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1\1s. Greenheart: Yes, and also a low tax, annual tax.
Mr. Dvorak: Did you discuss maintenance?
Ms. Greenheart: WelL vacant land, I assumed there would not be any
maintenance, as long as it isMr. Dvorak: So you wanted no maintenance?
Ms. Greenheart: That's right.

[March 5-6,2013 Trial Transcript; Tr. pg. 130, 1. 12 thm pg. 131,1. 4J
The exchange between the Brovvns' legal counsel and Ms. Greenhem1 quoted above is the only
line of questioning regarding any purpose 'v"hy Greenhem1 wanted to purchase land and
establishes that Greenheart did not have a commercial purpose purchasing the prope11y. All she
stated was that she was left money :ii-om her mother and wanted to buy land and in fact
contemplated moving to Idaho in the future.

Greenheart's testimony shows that she was

purchasing the prope11y for personal reasons rather than for a commercial venture.
An appellate com1 will only set aside a trial com1's findings of fact if they are clearly
erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a) (2002); McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 513,20 P.3d 693,
697 (2001); In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454,19 P.3d 766,768 (2001). In
deciding whether fmdings of fact are clearly erroneous, the appellate com1 detem1ines whether
the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139
Idaho 548, 549-550, 82 P.3d 830, 831-832 (2003). The testimony quoted above does not support
the district court's findings of fact that Greenhem1looked to invest in real property in Mountain
Home nor does it supp0l1 the conclusion that Greenl1em1 was going to use the property for a
commercial purpose.
Even if this Court were to infer that Greenheart used her inheritance money to 'invest'
into real property that inference does not establish that she had a commercial purpose for
purchasing the property. Greenheart's use of her inheritance money to purchase real property as
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an investment is no different than someone using part of their salary to put into an individual
retirement account (IRA) or someone who puts money in an interest bearing savings bank
account. In both those examples, the interest eamed in an IRA or savings account (similar to
propelty value going up) is not a commercial venture but done for personal purposes.
On page 11, footnote 26 of the district comt's 1'vlemorandul17 Decision and Order
Granting In Part P!aint~ffs Fees and Costs; [R. Vol. III, p. 619J the comt held that its decision
to award attomey fees was consistent with the following cases:
Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 306, 900 P.2d 201,214 (et. App. 1995) (concluding

that the lease of real property constituted a conm1ercial transaction w here the land was purchased
for the purpose of operating a commercial cattle ranch" and where the purchaser "did not
maintain a home on the ranch property"); Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 216-219, 159 PJd
851, 853-856 (2007) (concluding sale of real propelty constituted a conm1ercial transaction
where the land was purchased as a family retreat and in large part for the purposes of logging it
and the district court was called upon to apportion the logging proceeds"); Garner v. Bartschi,
1239 Idaho 430, 439,80 P.3d 1031,1040 (2003) (concluding the sale of real propelty constituted
a commercial transaction where the land was purchased "for the purpose of Gamer establishing
an elk ranch," but not mentioning any residence or home on the property even though the
propelty description was a significant issue in the lawsuit); and Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v.
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994) (concluding the sale of real propelty constituted

a commercial transaction where "Stevenson and the Bank entered into a transaction to finance
the purchase of real property, which Stevensen intended to use and did use for his commercial
farming operations."
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All the cases relied upon by the district court are distinguishable ii-om the facts of this
case because there is no evidence that Greenhemt intended to use the property for a commercial
venture (e.g. cattle operation; elk farm; logging operation etc.)

The evidence is clear that

Greenhemt did absolutely nothing with the property after she bought it. Greenhemt only entered
into the grazing lease with Jay Brown to get a tax exemption not to run a cattle operation.
Therefore the district court erred in holding that Greenhemt entered into the contract for a
conm1ercial purpose.

b. There ,,,as no evidence of the Browns' purpose and intent for selling the
property to Greenheart.
The district court specifically held "there was no testimony at trial directly addressing the
Plaintiff s purpose for listing the si>.'ty acres for sale" A1emorandul11 Decision and Order

Granting In Part Plainttff's Fees and Costs p. 10; [R. Vo. III, p. 618] yet the court chose to
cobble together evidence adduced at trial regarding what the Browns did with their property
when they O\vned it to find that the Browns had a commercial purpose for selling the sixty acres
to Greenhemt. Specifically, the district court noted that the Browns:
... leased portions of their land's appurtenant water rights to the Idaho Water
Resource Board since 2003 and derived rent fl:om that lease. In 2006, Mr. Brown had
contracted to sell 272 acres of the water rights to the Idaho Water Company and that
contract was terminated after the sale of the sixty acres to Greenheart. Although the
Browns had their residence on the 320 acre tract, they farmed and ranched on the
portion ofthe land.
1d.

How the Browns used their property in the past does not automatically prove that the Browns
had a conm1ercial purpose for selling the property to Greenheart. This is not the law. Since the
Browns failed to provide evidence of their commercial intent for selling the properiy, the district
court erred in concluding that the gravamen of this lawsuit was a commercial transaction.
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VII.

Is Greenheart entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal?

Greenheart requests an award of attomey fees on appeal based on Idaho Code Section 12121. Idaho Code Section 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party when a
claim is pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without merit. I.c. § 12-121, I.R.C.P.
54(e)(1). All award ofattomey's fees a\vard under section 12-121 is discretionary on the court.
Chisholm v. TVlin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 136,75 P.2d 185,190 (2003).
In this case, attomey fees on appeal are awardable under 12-121 because the Browns did
not plead mistake in their Complaint and/or plead mistake with particularity. Since the Browns
did not seek a remedy under the equitable theory of mistake, it is clear that the Browns should
have recognized that their request for declaratory relief to interpret the Warranty Deed was
outside the four year statute of limitations ofldaho Code Section 5-224. Moreover, the Koon v.
Empey, 40 Idaho 6, 231 P. 1097, 1099 (1924) has made very clear that when a deed uses
"appurtenance language" that phrase is unambiguous and has the legal effect of transferring
water with the land. As such, the question asked in the Browns' declaratory action had been
answered over eighty years ago by the Idaho Supreme Court. Thus, it appears that it cannot be
said that the Browns will be able to provide a defense that is not frivolous or unreasonable in
addressing its pleading deficiency and failure to bring their case within the statute of limitations
in their Respondent's Brief.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Greenheart respectfully requests that this Court set aside the
judgment reforming the Warranty Deed and granting the Browns attomey fees.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2013
Borton Lakey Law Offices
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